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Article 5

Feminist Jurisprudence: Justice and Care
I. INTRODUCTION

The nature of law changes according to one's perspective of, or the
way one views, the law. 1 Jurisprudence is a collection of those perspectives, and includes many subcategories, including positivist jurisprudence, natural law, originalism, utilitarianism, and legal realism. 2 Jurisprudential theory is important in order to have a viewpoint from which to
examine cases and the law, and we submit that feminist theory provides
fertile ground for examining and developing law under a practical jurisprudence. 3 Feminist jurisprudence, if the number of books and arti

1. According to the Heisenberg indeterminacy principle, we cannot observe both the
location and the motion of sub-atomic particles at the same time. To observe one, is to change the
other. We think this principle applies to other things as well; the observation of a phenomenon
(such a social movement) will often cause that phenomenon itself to change. STEPHEN W.
HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES 54-56 (1988).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (6th ed. 1991) defines "jurisprudence" as: "The
philosophy of law, or the science which treats of the principles of positive law and legal relations."
In short, jurisprudence looks at legal systems and how they function. Scales writes that in addition
to looking at the structure of legal systems and valuing abstract principles such as neutrality, we
need to do more when evaluating legal systems:
A legal system must attempt to assure fairness. Fairness must have reference
to real human predicaments. Abstract universality is a convenient device for some
philosophical pursuits, or for any endeavor whose means can stand without ends,
but it is only extrinsically important. Its actual value depends upon its success
in promoting that which is intrinsically valuable. By inquiring into the mythic
structure of objectivity, we see that abstract universality explicitly contradicts the
ideal of a "government of laws, not men." Our task therefore, is to construct a
system which avoids solipsism, which recognizes that the subjectivity of the lawmaker is not the whole of reality.
Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1380
(1986).
3. As Cole notes, "social theorists need a method." David Cole, Getting There: Reflections
on Trashing From Feminist Jurisprudence and Critical Theory, 8 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 59, 59
(1985). Feminists are, without question, social theorists in the respect that they are deeply
concerned with changing society. Cole defines method as "the bridge between theory and practice."
/d. at 59, n. 3. It is one thing to develop a theory, but it is an entirely different proposition to turn
that theory into practice. Scales writes:
Law needs some theory of differentiation. Feminism, as a theory of
differentiation, is particularly well suited to it. Feminism brings law back to its
purpose--to decide the moral crux of the matter in real human situations. Law
is a complex system of communication; its communicative matrix is intended to
give access to the moral crux. Finding the crux depends upon the relation among
things, not upon their opposition. In any case, imperfect analogies are available;
a case is similar or dissimilar to others in an unlimited variety of ways. The
scope and limits of any analogy must be explored in each case, with social reality
as our guide. This is a normative, but not illogical process. Any logic is a norm,
and cannot be used except with reference to its purposes. Why should that be so
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cles on the subject are any indication, 4 is a dynamic area of legal thought.
But before one may define a "feminist" jurisprudence, one must first look
to the meaning of feminism. 5

A. A Brief History of Feminism
It can be argued that feminism, in one form or another, existed even
before the Golden Age of Greece. 6 Feminism and feminists today take
many forms and are known by many labels: radical, or dominance feminists; "pragmatic" feminists; essentialist feminists; formal equality feminists; substantive equality feminists; nonsubordination feminists; dominance theory feminists; different voice feminists; and non-essentialism
feminists. More relevant to our consideration is the development of the
feminist movement in Western culture and the particular forms of feminism that are currently part of the feminist dialogue.
The roots of modern feminism date from the French and American
revolutions. From that time the question arose, "If men should be free,
why not women too?" Mary Wollstonecraft wrote A Vindication of the
Rights of Men during the French Revolution as a response to Edmund
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, in which he attacked the
revolution and its sympathizers? Her book was popular and successful
until other works, such as Thomas Paine's The Rights of Men, supplanted
its popularity. 8 Wollstonecraft also wrote A Vindication of the Rights of
Women using the same type of reasoning she used in her first work. THE
Rights of Women is a well-written treatise, but the book lost popularity

hard to perceive, to teach, and to do?
Scales, supra note 2, at 1387.
4. In February 1997 a WES1LAW search among law reviews and other legal periodicals
under the search terms feminist and jurisprttdence returned 3180 different citations.
5. Many questions abound about how feminist ideas could or ought to address perceived
flaws in the current legal system:
Feminist legal scholars have devoted enormous energies to patching the cracks
in the [legal system]. The debate has been and continues to be, arduous. Which
differences between the sexes are or should be relevant for legal purposes? How
does one tell what the differences are? Does it matter whether the differences are
inherent or the result of upbringing? Is it enough to distinguish between accurate
and inaccurate stereotyped differences? Or are there situations where differences
are sufficiently "real" and permanent to demand social accommodation?
Scales, supra note 3, at 1375. Even self-described feminists disagree about the exact definition of
"feminism." We have attempted to use the term inclusively. See infra, note 11.
6. See, E.g., ARISTOPHANES, LYSISTRATA (Donald Sutherland, trans., 1961) (The play's
comedy turns on women's decision to abstain from social contacts with men so as to persuade the
men to cease their warring ways.).
7. 2 THE NORTON ANrHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 99 (M. H. Abrams et al. eds., 6th
ed. 1993).
8. !d.
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after Wollstonecraft's death, when her well-meaning but naive husband
exposed her unconventional way of life. 9
John Stuart Mill, best known for his work on Benthamism and economics, was another notable proponent of the female rights. Mill was the
first to make a motion in the House of Commons for female suffrage, and
he and/or his wife, Harriet Taylor, wrote the revolutionary work, The
Subjugation of Women. 10 The strains of women's legal voice have risen in
a steady crescendo ever since. 11

B. Six Forms of Modern Feminism
Feminism today may be classified into at least six separate schools of
thought. The first type of feminism, formal equality, can be described as
the principle of equal treatment: "individuals who are alike should be
treated alike." Thus, men and women, as substantially alike individuals
who differ biologically and perhaps psychologically, but not in any other
substantial way "should have the exact same legal rights." 12 Aristotle referred to this kind of equality, although only in relation to men. Scales
writes, "In this country, the engine of the struggle for equality has been
Aristotelian: Equality means to treat like persons alike, and unlike persons unlike." 13 The formal equality model of feminism is rapidly losing

9. !d. at 101.
10. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text
11. As Cole notes: "The term 'feminism' encompasses a wide range of political and
personal stances." Like Cole,
[ w ]hen this Article uses the term broadly, it is not so much to describe a
particular substantive content as to locate a perspective in the social
spectrum. . . . In this broad sense, "feminist" refers to any claim that articulates
a position related to women or "the feminine," ... and that substantively affirms
women's right to equality. . . . [i]t is not to suggest that feminism is monolithic,
but only that various feminisrns share certain generalizable attributes and
perspectives that afford insights into self-reflection."
Cole, supra note 3, at 59, n. 82. We also recognize that not all feminists are women nor are all
women feminists. As MacKinnon notes: "Male is a social and political concept, not a biological
attribute. As I use it, it has nothing whatever to do with inherency, preexistence, nature,
inevitability, or body as such." Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State:
ToY.oard Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 636 n.3 (1983) (emphasis in original). If we do not
define "male" and "female" strictly along sexual lines, the reader may wonder why we bother to
differentiate between the two views at all. Gilligan gives one explanation:
Nancy Chodorow, attempting to account for "the reproduction within each
generation of certain general and nearly universal differences that characterize
masculine and feminine personality and roles," attributes these differences
between the sexes not to anatomy but rather to "the fact that women, universally,
are largely responsible for early child care."
CAROL Gll.UGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 7 (1982) quoting Nancy Chodorow, Family Structure and
Feminine Personality, WOMAN, CULTURE AND SociETY (M.Z. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere, eds., 1974).
12. KATHARINE T. BARTIEIT, ET Al, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY
71 (1993).
13. Scales, supra note 2, at 1374 (footnote omitted).
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popularity because it does not adequately deal with gender differences;
nonetheless, this early brand of feminist reasoning has led to greater
women's suffrage, increased equal protection of the law, and equal pay.
Second, the substantive equality form of feminism looks at the results
or effects of a rule or law. 14 Substantive equality demands "that rules take
account of these differences to avoid unfair, gender-related outcomes." 15
"The test in any challenge should be 'whether the policy or practice in
question integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a
deprived position because of gender status.' " 16 Substantive equality has
focused on such things as maternity leave provisions and child care assistance, but has also addressed such issues as affirmative action and other
gender-specific benefits to remedy past societal discrimination. 17 As
Scales notes, "the 'relevant' differences have been and always will be
those which keep women in their place." 18
Third, nonsubordination or dominance theory focuses on the "imbalance of power between women and men." 19 This theory primarily
addresses the issue of "whether a rule or practice serves to subordinate
women to men. " 20 The dominance theory focuses on issues such as sexual
harassment of women, marital rape, domestic violence, and the battered
women syndrome.
Fourth, the autonomy theory of feminism argues "that women should
have greater personal autonomy, freedom to make their own choices, and
power to control their own lives." 21
A fifth type of feminist theory is non-essentialism, which deals with
the problem of over generalization, or the stereotyping of members of a
particular group. 22 According to Bartlett, non-essentialism's primary focus is on "the implied attribution to all women of the traits of those who
are white, middle class, heterosexual, able-bodied, and otherwise privi-

14. Scales writes:
In the past, biological differences have been used to show that classifications are
not sex-based. Thereby, the reasons for having antidiscrimination laws have been
seen as the reasons to allow discrimination. . . . The issue is not freedom to be
treated without regard to sex; the issue is freedom from systematic subordination
because of sex.
!d. at 1394.
15. BARTLETT, supra note 12, at 249.
16. Scales, supra note 2, at 1394 (footnotes omitted). Scales borrows this question from
Catharine MacKinnon.
17. BARTLETT, supra note 12, at 249.
18. Scales, supra note 2, at 1378 (footnote omitted).
19. BARTLETT, supra note 12, at 413.
20. ld.
21. !d. at 671.
22. ld. at 871.
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leged. " 23 Non-essentialists believe that the differences between individual
women need to be more fully taken into account.
Finally, the feminine or different voice(s) theory looks at "women's
differences ... less as problems to be addressed than as potentially valuable resources that might serve as a better model of social organization
and law than existing 'male' characteristics and values." 24
Although each form of feminism has much to offer (and there is some
overlap among them), this paper deals primarily with different voice theory. Different voice theory lends itself particularly well to the development of a fair and practical jurisprudence, and we hope to demonstrate
that a workable jurisprudential model may be drawn from the best elements of both "female" and "male" legal perspectives without ignoring
the contributions of men or by making women into helpless victims and
ignoring autonomy. The question, therefore, is not which gender is
right-but what is fair for both sexes in achieving "justice."
C.

The Different Voice

Baier writes:
It is clear, I think, that the best moral theory has to be a cooperative product of women and men, has to harmonize justice and
care. The morality it theorizes about is after all for all persons,
for men and for women, and will need their combined
insights .... what we need now is a "marriage" of the old male
and the newly articulated femaie insights. 25

The model for feminine jurisprudence is not necessarily based upon
uniquely female characteristics. While many of the characteristics of feminine jurisprudence are not gender-specific, they are perhaps most often
and most easily traced through the feminine experience. Thus, instead of
looking at the concept of a "feminine" jurisprudence as a pure gender
issue, it is useful to consider the different voice as
characterized not by gender but by theme. Its association with
women is an empirical observation, and it is primarily through
women's voices that [one may] trace its development. But this
association is not absolute, and the contrasts between male and
female voices . . . highlight a distinction between two modes of

23. /d.
24. Id, at 589.
25. Annette C. Baier, The Need for More than Justice, JUSTICE AND CARE: EsSENTIAL
READINGS IN FEMINIST ETHICS 47, 57 (Virginia Held ed., 1995).
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thought and . . . focus on a problem of interpretation rather than
[a representation or] generalization about either sex. 26
Obviously there are inherent differences between men and women
But it is often difficult to say "different" without making a value judgement. By some feminists' definition, maleness or femaleness is not in
itself biologically defined, but socially determined. As one feminist uses
the terminology, for instance, "maleness" is "more epistemological than
ontological, undercutting the distinction itself, given male power to conform being with perspective ...
In this view, the "female" or the
"male" voice is not an inborn trait that accompanies either an X or a Y
chromosome. Each voice can be found in every person, and the discovery
of that voice is dependent upon the person's individual experience and
the social milieu in which the individual spends his or her formative
years. "The perspective from the male standpoint is not always each
man's opinion, although most men adhere to it, nonconsciously and without considering it a point of view, as much because it makes sense of
their experience (the male experience) as because it is in their interest." 28
The male voice is the male voice because it makes sense of the male experience. Similarly, the female voice-a voice different from the voice
heard so loudly for centuries-is the female voice because it makes sense
of the female experience.

:m

I.

A Caring Judicial System

The idea of a judicial system based on care, rather than on rules,
draws heavily from the work of noted psychologist Carol Gilligan.
Gilligan's research is based on observations of children, and those observations have been extrapolated to include adults' actions as well:
In a study on sex differences on the games that children play
done on elementary-school-aged children, it was found that "boys
play out of doors more often than girls do; boys play more often
in large and age-heterogenous groups than girls; they play competitive games more often, and their games last longer than girls'
games." 29
The last finding is interesting because it demonstrates that

GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 2.
MacKinnon, supra note 11, at 636, n.3.
ld.
GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 4 (quoting Janet Lever, Sex Differences in the Games
Children Play, 23 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 478-487 (1976)).
26.
27.
28.
29.
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[b]oys' games appeared to last longer not only because they required a higher degree of skill and were thus less likely to
become boring, but also because, when disputes arose in the
course of a game, boys were able to resolve the disputes more
effectively than girls .... In fact, it seemed that the boys enjoyed
the legal debates as much as they did the game itself. 30
Perhaps then, the traditionally male-dominated legal profession, which is
by nature a dispute-resolving discipline, became male-dominated out of
primitive man's ability to effectively resolve the earliest playground disputes over the last drumstick from Tyrannosaurus Rex.
But while males seem to demonstrate a talent for confrontation and
debate, girls, as Gilligan observed, tend to be more pragmatic toward the
rules of the game. 31 For while males tend throughout childhood to
become "increasingly fascinated with legal elaboration of rules and the
development of fair procedures for adjudicating conflicts, [that fascinationj does not hold for girls." 32 Girls regarded rules as good as long as the
rule compensated completely for any harm that may have been done by
the rule's violation. Generally, the girls observed were more tolerant
about violations of the rules, more willing to make exceptions, more easily reconciled to changes in the game, and more likely to resolve conflicts
creatively. 33 Gilligan's thesis is that care and relationships are largely
overlooked by the judicial system's current methods of analyzing moral
dilemmas. But "while they are used by both men and women, women focus on care and relationships considerably more than men do." 34
2.

Adapting

Considering the playground of contemporary society, in which the
rules of the game have been drawn and are strictly enforced primarily by
males, "if a girl does not want to be left dependent on men, she will have
to learn to play like a boy." 35 Very often, learning "to play like a boy"
requires a woman to subvert, or at least stifle, her feminine voice in order
to make it in a man's world. Generally when the law deals with a para-

30. !d. at 9.
31. !d. at 10. Lever points out that "girls are more tolerant in their attitudes toward rules,
more willing to make exceptions, and more easily reconciled to innovations. As a result, the legal
sense ... 'is far Jess developed in little girls than in boys.'" !d. (citations omitted).
32. !d. at 10.
33. !d.
34. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3,
34-35 (1988).
35. GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 10.
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dox, it deals with it by suppressing the disruptive term. 36 The law does
not favor nonconformity. The principle of civil disobedience is evidence
of, and is in fact based upon the law's distaste for nonconformity. For
someone to approach the law with the attitude of being more tolerant,
willing to make more exceptions, and more easily reconciled to innovations-that is, with a different, or feminine voice, history has shown that
often the nonconforming attitude will be met with disdain, indifference,
or even contempt:
With respect to many gender-related issues, the law ignores
woman's perspective and treats man's perspective as objective
truth. It strives to impose order on a disordered world by incorporating difference (women, Blacks, gays, the poor) through assimilation, or denying difference through exclusion. In law, one side
must win .... It requires the drawing of lines between that which
is "inside," or legitimate, and that which is "outside," or illegal.
Historically, heterosexual white men have drawn those lines.
Thus, the legal perspective, despite its facade of neutrality and
objectivity, is defined by the male perspective. 37
Traditional legal theory does not allow for many grey areas. It is obvious
that the values of women and men differ. A day in the life of a married
couple will attest to that fact. So it is in society, where very often those
values have been codified into law. Yet, "it is the masculine values that
prevail."38 Very often male behavior is regarded as the norm and female
behavior as some deviation from that norm. 39 And like the boys playing
games on the playground, application of these masculine values requires
that all cases have a winner and a loser.
Even so, society is gradually getting away from the "winner-loser"
mind set with the growing popularity of alternative dispute resolution and
other "win-win" negotiative processes. It seems logical that other
contextual-based and discretionary options could also be integrated into
current legal framework. Over a century ago the value of a discretionary
voice in the courtroom was known. As Matthew Carpenter, addressing
the United States Supreme Court, put it, while some cases may require
"rough qualities possessed by men, ... [t]here are many causes in which

36. See Cole, supra note 3, at 83.
37.

!d. (citations omitted).

38.

VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 76 (1929) (quoted irt GILLIGAN, supra note

11,at16).

39. GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 14 (citing DAVID MCCLELLAND, POWER: THE INNER
EXPERIENCE 81 (1975)).
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the silver voice of woman would accomplish more than the severity and
sternness of man could achieve. " 40 Whereas in traditional jurisprudence
women's issues are seen often as problems that need to be addressed,
feminist jurisprudence sees gender differences "as potentially valuable
resources that might serve as a better model of social organization and
Jaw than existing 'male' characteristics and values." 41
II.

THE PROBLEMS WITH TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

In the first section of the paper we defined jurisprudence and several
types of feminism. In this section we discuss why more traditional forms
of jurisprudence are not entirely satisfactory. We are not claiming that
feminist jurisprudence is the ultimate solution to all of society's problems, but incorporation of a feminine voice into the chorus of legal
thought may provide a fresh perspective in solving some of traditional
legal theory's problems.
A. Male Bias and Female Invisibility

Scales writes that "[t]he term 'feminist jurisprudence' disturbs people. That is not surprising, given patriarchy's convenient habit of labeling
as unreliable any approach that admits to be interested, and particularly
given the historic a priori invalidation of women's experience."42 "Thus,
the legal perspective, despite its facade of neutrality and objectivity, is
defined by the male perspective. The law, moreover, carries the authority
of the state, and it is thereby empowered to make man's point of view a
reality." 43 However, as feminists and post-modernists agree, there is no
objective position from which we can view life. We cannot not directly
interact with life, a text, or a case. We are always interpreting the environmental stimuli we deal with; however, in making our interpretations
we are constrained by the community and culture in which we live. By
that we mean that there is no such thing as "objective meaning." Yet, neither is meaning itself completely subjective. We live in a historical, communal, and cultural structure that constrains meaning in certain ways. All
approaches are interested and biased to some extent-if for no other reason than the time in which we live and the assumptions we grow up with.
Any system that ignores the perspective of an entire class or entire classes
of people is at best unfair, and at worst, perilous. Even with the system's

40.
41.
42.
43.

Matthew Carpenter, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, at 137 (1872).
BARTLETT, supra note 12, at 589.
Scales, supra note 2, at 1399.
Cole, supra note 3, at 83-84.
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claim of neutrality and objectivity, it strains to "hear" the different voice
with its somewhat limited hearing. Robin West adds:
By the claim that modern jurisprudence is "masculine," I mean
two things. First I mean that the values [and] the dangers that
characterize women's lives are not reflected at any level whatsoever in contracts, torts, constitutional law, or any other field of
legal doctrine. The values that flow from women's material potential for physical connection are not recognized as values by
the Rule of Law, and the dangers attendant to that state are not
recognized as dangers by the Rule of Law. 44
Often male-based systems deal in dichotomies, such as male/female,
good/bad, right/wrong, but life rarely breaks down into such neat categories. Cole explains how this tendency works in society: "[o]ur culture denies the feminine an independent voice and defines the feminine as other
to man's one, as object to man's subject. " 45 Society's definition is problematic, because when faced with two choices, one choice tends to be
labeled "good" while the other is labeled "bad."
[S]ex role turns out to be one of the most important determinants
of human behavior; psychologists have found sex differences in
their studies from the moment they started doing empirical research. But since it is difficult to say "different" without saying
"better" or "worse," since there is a tendency to construct a single scale of measurement, and since that scale has generally been
derived from and standardized on the basis of men's interpretations of research data drawn predominantly or exclusively from
studies of males, psychologists "have tended to regard male behavior as the 'norm' and female behavior as some kind of deviation from that norm. " 46
Law is particularly susceptible to this polarized way of thinking:
In the past, two legal choices appeared to resolve claims of social
injustice: Law could either ignore differences, thereby risking
needless conformity, or it could freeze differences, thereby creating a menu of justifications for inequality. Concrete universality

44. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
45. Cole, supra note 3, at 79-80.
46. GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 14, quoting DAVID MCCLELI.AND, POWER: THE INNER
EXPERffiNCE 81 (1975).
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eliminates the need for such a choice. When our priority is to understand differences and to value multiplicity, we need only to
discern between occasions of respect and occasions of oppression. Those are judgments we know how to make, even without a
four-part test to tell us, for every future circumstance, what constitutes domination. 47
Perhaps the law is so susceptible to polarized thinking because it is used
to operating with two adversarial parties. One of the things feminists do,
is to try to escape dichotomies and to see that there are a whole range of
choices between the extremes available; this also allows the labels of
"good" and "bad" to slip away, and also permits other implications of a
case to be more fully considered, such as how the case will affect society
as a whole, and how great are the needs of the parties and their families in
the long run. Perhaps law's polarized vision explains why it is a "truism
that hard cases make bad law." 48 Justices have wanted to do the right
thing, but have not been able to see all the choices open to them.
B.

Justice Without Care Leads to Unhappiness

The story of the life of John Stuart Mill is illustrative of the difficulties with focusing on justice to the exclusion of other feelings and considerations. Mill was "deliberately trained by his father [to become] the
leader of the Utilitarians" after the death of Bentham. 49 When Mill was
about twenty, he faced "a great crisis in his mental development-the
kind of self-searching forty-days-in-the-wilderness ... that so many other
Victorians underwent." 50 Today, we would probably refer to his experience as a major depression. 51 "His Benthamistic desire to reform the
world no longer seemed to him sufficient cause for living."52 Justice
alone no longer satisfied him, and he was, in fact, profoundly unhappy.
Mill overcame his crisis, or depression, through reading Wordsworth,
Coleridge, Goethe, and Carlyle, and concluding that "although Benthamism rightly regarded happiness as the end of life, a person can attain hap-

47. Scales, supra note 2, at 1388.
48. Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm., 502 U.S. 197, 207 (1991) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
49. John W. Bowyer & John L. Brooks, Introduction to John Stuart Miil, THE VICTORIAN
AGE 239 (2nd ed. 1954).
50. !d. at 240.
51. See NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 7, at 993. Mill's condition is referred to as a
"nervous breakdown," and since this term has next to no legal or medical significance, we have
chosen to use the term "depression."
52. THE VICTORIAN AGE, supra note 50, at 240. Suicidal ideation is a classic sign of
depression.
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piness only by seeking such an unselfish end as the happiness of
others." 53 In other words, Mill realized that what is today known as the
ethic of care was just as important as the ethic of justice. Or put another
way, multiple viewpoints are not only helpful but healthy. Others have
noticed that the law's exclusive focus on justice causes unhappiness for
others.
For the main complaint about the Kantian version of a society
with its first virtue justice, construed as respect for equal right to
formal goods such as having contracts kept, due process, equal
opportunity including opportunity to participate in political activities leading to policy and law-making, to basic liberties of
speech, free association and assembly, religious worship, is that
none of these goods do much to ensure that the people who have
them and mutually respect such rights will have any other relationships to one another than the minimal relationship needed to
keep such a 'civil society' going. They may well be lonely,
driven to suicide, apathetic about their work and about participation in political processes, find their lives meaningless and have
no wish to leave offspring to face the same meaningless
existence. Their rights, and respect for rights, are quite compatible with very great misery, and misery whose causes are not just
individual misfortunes and psychic sickness, but social and moral
impoverishment. 54
This malaise affects women more than it affects men. Cole points out that
"[o]ne cannot speak as a feminist in a social culture that defines feminine
as silent without some measure of affirmative self-reflection.... For a
woman to be unreflective in man's world is to be objectified, silenced,
and pacified-to be rendered an object."55 And those women who realize
that they have been rendered an object experience feelings of frustration,
depression, and powerlessness. Only by adding the feminine voice to the
already existing voice, can we hope to achieve what Bentham and Mill
hoped to achieve: the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Some
would argue that the male voice needs to be silenced in order to hear the

53. Id.
54. Baier, supra note 25, at 51. See also, Robert Wright, The Evolution of Despair, TIME,
Aug. 28, 1995, at 50 (discussing the theories of evolutionary psychologists who argue that our
psyches are unsuited to live in the modern world, and that humans have become incTeasingly
depressed because of growing isolation from one another).
55. Cole, supra note 3, at 81.
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feminine voice. Others seek a greater blend of voices, hoping to change
what sounds like a solo into a harmonious duet.
It is not only in legal circles that people have become concerned
about what happens to people when they concentrate solely on justice.
Baier writes that recently in moral and social philosophy, while not denying the importance of justice, people are nevertheless "challenging the
assumed supremacy of justice among the moral and social virtues." 56 She
notes that the challenge is surprising because many who are challenging
the supremacy of justice are those who have historically been denied it.
She writes:
Those who have only recently won recognition of their equal
rights, who have only recently seen the correction or partial correction of longstanding racist and sexist injustices to their race
and sex, are among the philosophers now suggesting that justice
is only one virtue among many, and one that may need the presence of the others in order to deliver its own undenied value. " 57
She also notes that many such philosophers have been influenced by
Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice. 5 8 Perhaps these philosophers, while
marginalized, have learned to value what we might term the "feminine"
and they have realized that while they have achieved much by gaining
access to "justice," they also risk losing part of their voice if they give up
the values they previously held. 59
Scales describes her vision of life without the ethic of care in the following quotation; she also points out the problem inherent in taking the
ethic of care too far:
The rights-based side of things, for all its grand abstraction, describes a pretty grim view of life on the planet. It treats individuals in society as isolated monads, as natural adversaries who must
each stake out his own territory and protect it with the
sword/shield mechanisms called 'rights.' This model of aggression is half of what is required for holocaust. False glorification
of the "care-based" ethic supplies the other side of the suicidal
equation, because a death march requires willing-looking victims.
The incorporationist version of the care-based ethic celebrates
oblivion. Its Disney-movie appeal diverts attention from the issue

56. Baier, supra note 25, at 47.
57. !d.
58. !d.
59. See the discussion infra of Bender's tort students text part IV.
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of powerlessness, and, indeed, makes a political virtue of it. Masters glorify the contentment of their slaves, empires of their colonies. Here, hegemony strikes again. An incorporationist legal regime would, at best, merely institutionalize a familiar female
critique-steady but ineffectual. 60
The problems with a feminist-based jurisprudence will be discussed further in section IV.

C. Another Problem-The System Is Not Working
Another problem with the traditional system of justice is that family
law issues often receive short shrift-they are not dealt with as the serious and far-reaching issues they are. For example, until 1992 Utah had
yet to do away with the marital rape exemption. That is, one spouse could
not successfully charge the other spouse with rape. One reason for the
delay could very well have been the preponderance of male judges and
attorneys who form and interpret the state's laws.
The first Menendez brothers trial and the OJ. Simpson criminal trial
showed us that something is seriously amiss in the United States criminal
trial system. The United States civil trial system is not without its problems, either. The recent brouhaha surrounding a multimillion dollar jury
verdict for spilled coffee shows that some tort awards are completely out
of proportion to the damage suffered. Ideally, the American legal system
operates upon the notion that justice is "blind," and that all are equal before the bench. The notion operates differently, however, in practice. In
many cases the rich and the white get a different brand of justice than the
poor and the black 61 These are all problems that need to be dealt with
soon by the legal profession or the legislative branch will make its own
changes.

D. Feminist Jurisprudence is Threatening
Many people are afraid that if we incorporate a feminist justice of
care into our legal system the result will be anarchy, or at least a reduction of legal stability. The choice, however, is not between the status quo
and no law at all. Our responsibility is to improve the law and make it
more responsive to all citizens. American jurisprudence is a constantly

60. Scales, supra note 2, at 1391-92 (footnote omitted).
61. As an illustration, take the factually similar and contemporaneous cases involving
political scion William Kennedy Smith, who is white, and professional boxing champion Mike
Tyson, who is black. Both men were accused of rape. Both men asserted the defense that the
women "meant yes, even while crying no." Smith was acquitted. Tyson was convicted.
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growing, constantly developing, very much alive creature. By its very
nature it must change and adapt to its surroundings. Utter rejection of the
status quo is not necessary-merely a channeling of the direction of jurisprudential change. Just as Audre Lourde states that we can never dismantle the master's house with the master's tools/ 2 neither can we dismantle
the house of justice without tools. What is needed is new tools to repair
and perhaps remodel the house of justice. 63
Baier writes:
The most obvious point is the challenge to the individualism of
the Western tradition, to the fairly entrenched belief in the possibility and desirability of each person pursuing his own good in
his own way, constrained only by a minimal formal common
good namely a working legal apparatus that enforces contracts
and protects individuals from undue interference by others.
Gilligan reminds us that noninterference can, especially for the
relatively powerless, such as the very young, amount to neglect,
and even between equals can be isolating and alienating. 64
And Baier adds:
Traces of the old patriarchal poison still remain in even the best
contemporary moral theorizing. Few may actually say that
women's place is in the home, but there is much muttering, when
unemployment figures rise, about how the relatively recent flood
of women into the work force complicates the problem, as if it
would be a good thing if women just went back home whenever
unemployment rises, to leave the available jobs for the men. We
still do not really have a wide acceptance of the equal right of
women to employment outside the home. Nor do we have wide
acceptance of the equal duty of men to perform those domestic
tasks which in no way depend on female anatomy, namely cooking, cleaning, and the care of weaned children. 65
We need to find a way of incorporating individual rights with caring relationships and realize that not all are equal-whether or not the law states
that we are created as equals. The law already treats children and the

62.
63.
GEO. L.J.
64.
65.

110, 111 (1984).
See Cheryl B. Preston, This Old House: A Blueprint for Constructive Feminism, 83
2271 (1995).
Baier, supra note 25, at 52.
!d. at 54.
AUDRE LOURDE, SISTER OUTSIDER,
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mentally incompetent differently, we need to allow for other differences
and varied life situations. Justice should be the right of every man and
woman-not just the privileged.
Ill. TowARD AFEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
As Cornell writes, "[fjeminists, for all of the divergence among them,
continue to join in a united call for justice for women. " 66 Mill was an active proponent of women's rights, possibly in part because of the change
in his value system. "In 1866 Mill made the tirst motion in the House of
Commons for woman suffrage."67 "In 1869 Mill said that he regarded the
emancipation of women and co-operative production as the two great
changes necessary to the regeneration of society. We of course agree that
the greater cooperation of women and men could change society and is a
goal worth pursuing. Mill published THE SUBJUGATION OF WOMEN in
1869. It is an excellent statement of the feminist arguments based on traditional, or male biased legal philosophy."68 Mill's work represents a continuing tradition as feminists continue to work for equality.

66. Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the limit: Systems Theory a11d Feminist Legal
Refonn, DECONSTRUCI'ION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 68 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992).
67. THE VICTORIAN AGE, supra note 50, at 241. The fact that a man, who wa~ a member
of the House of Commons had to propose extending the vote to women illustrates Baier's point
that
Rights have usually been for the privileged. Talking about laws, and the rights
those Ia ws recognize and protect, does not in itself ensure that the group of
legislators and rights-holders will not be restricted to some elite. Bills of right~
have usually been proclamations of the right of some in-group, barons, landowners, males, whites, non-foreigners. The "justice perspective," and the legal
sense that goes with it, are shadowed by their patriarchal past.
Baier, supra note 25, at 53. Howe.ver, as Baier also notes, the "privileged" have used the existing
legal system to expand society's concept of rights and to expand the types of people entitled to
protection of their rights. Mill and Wollstonecraft are two examples; the problem is, however, that
this approach can only go so far.
It is however also true that the moral theories that made the concept of a
person's right central were not just the instrument~ for excluding some persons,
but also the instruments used by those who demanded that more and more
persons be included in the favored group. Abolitionists, reformers, women, used
the language of rights to assert their claims to inclusion in the group of full
members of a community. The tradition of liberal moral theory has in fact
developed so as to include the women it had for so long excluded, to include the
poor as well as rich, blacks and whites, and so on. Women like Mary
W ollstonecraft used the male moral theories to good purpose. So we should not
he wholly ungrateful for those male moral theories, for all their objectionable
earlier content. They were undoubtedly patriarchal, but they also contained the
seeds of the challenge, or antidote, to this patriarchal poison.

Id.
68. THE VICTORIAN AGE, supra note 49, at 242. We realize that Mill's wife, Harriet Taylor,
may have written or co-written the article; even if this is so, Mill nonetheless permitted or insisted
that the article be published under his name.
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The lack of equality, and what to do about it, continues to be a problem in our society. However, feminists provide a unique perspective:
"Grounded in experience whose validity society has denied, a feminist is
less likely to be deluded into believing that we can unproblematically
think our way out."69 Because of this perspective, women seek a variety
of possible solutions instead of seeing problems as "either/or" propositions. "Within the 'different voice' theory, women's differences are viewed less as problems to be addressed than as potentially valuable resources
that might serve as a better model of social organization and law than existing 'male' characteristics and values."70 "Because the feminist in a
male society lives a paradoxical existence, she is able to pursue and reveal the latent contradictions in 'objective' social constructs.'m Relationships and the exercise of power are also important to feminists. Baier
writes:
Relationships between those who are clearly unequal in power,
such as parents and children, earlier and later generations in relation to one another, states and citizens, doctors and patients, the
well and the ill, large states and small states, have had to be
shunted to the bottom of the agenda, and then dealt with by some
sort of "promotion" of the weaker so that an appearance of virtual equality is achieved. Citizens collectively become equal to
states, children are treated as adults-to-be, the ill and dying are
treated as continuers of their earlier more potent selves, so that
their "rights" could be seen as the rights of equals. This pretense
of an equality that is in fact absent may often lead to desirable
protection of the weaker, or more dependent. But it somewhat
masks the question of what our moral relationships are to those
who are our superiors or our inferiors in power. A more realistic
acceptance of the fact that we begin as helpless children, that at
almost every point of our lives we deal with both the more and
the less helpless, that equality of power and interdependency,
between two persons or groups, is rare and hard to recognize
when it does occur, might lead us to a more direct approach to
questions concerning the design of institutions structuring these
relationships between unequals (families, schools, hospitals, armies) and of the morality of our dealings with the more and the
less powerful. 72

69.
70.
71.
72.

Cole, supra note 3, at 82.
BARTLETI, supra note 12, at 589.
Cole, supra note 3, at 62.
Baier, supra note 25, at 55 (emphasis in original).
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Obviously we cannot treat everyone as though they were equal in terms
of needs and individual capacity; an infant and the President of the
United States, for example, have little in common. The concept of differing power and need for care is suggested by the riddle of the sphinx} 3
Obviously someone who walks on four, then two, then three legs during
the course of his life is not always as "equal" as they might be at another
point in his life. A key question is: what are our moral relationships and
obligations to others?
A. Relationships and Obligations

Perhaps the answer is the "caring neighbor" standard; perhaps it is
something else that needs still to be developed. But whatever the standard
is or ought to be, no one has yet found a satisfactory answer. Feminists
are in a unique position to help develop a better resolution of the problem
with the sounding of their "different voice."
Baier pens:
Women's traditional work, of caring for the less powerful, especially for the young, is obviously socially vital. One cannot regard any version of morality that does not ensure that it gets well
done as an adequate "minimal morality," any more than we could
so regard one that left and concern for more distant future generations an optional extra. 74
When politicians speak of family values is this not what they mean, that
future generations will have the love and benefits that past generations
have enjoyed? Many are willing to argue that single parent families are
the single largest cause of the breakdown of society; does it not make
sense then, that we must all worry about future generations? Baier continues:
Vulnerable future generations do not choose their dependence on
earlier generations. The unequal infant does not choose its place
in a family or nation, nor is it treated as free to do as it likes until
some association is freely entered into. Nor do its parents always
choose their parental role, or freely assume their parental responsibilities any more than we choose our power to affect the conditions in which later generations will live. 75

73.

See SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS THE KING (David Grene & Richard Lattimore, eds., 1954).

74. Baier, supra note 25, at 55.
75. ld. at 56.
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We need to recognize that we all have obligations. There are always burdens to go with benefits, and to simply stress the ethic of rights is to
lie-for to be part of a community is to accept the responsibilities that go
with it. These responsibilities, to be truly effective, must be freely chosen
and self-enforced:
The emphasis on care goes with a recognition of the often
unchosen nature of the responsibilities of those who give care,
both of children who care for their aged or infirm parents, and of
parents who care for the children they in fact have. Contract soon
ceases to seem the paradigm source of moral obligation once we
attend to parental responsibility, and justice as a virtue of social
institutions will come to seem at best only first equal with the
virtue, whatever its name, that ensures that each new generation
is made appropriately welcome and prepared for their adult
lives. 76
So what is this ethic of care that we have been talking about? Baier
defines care as "a felt concern for the good of others and for community
with them. The 'cold jealous virtue of justice' (Hume) is found to be too
cold, and it is 'warmer' more communitarian virtues and social ideals that
are being called into supplement it.'m Notice that Baier uses the word
"supplement" not "replace." There are good things about our legal system; there is no need to throw out the baby with the bathwater, but occasionally, the water does need to be changed.
We are most interested in what feminism can add, not with destroying the system. Although justice and care seem to be somewhat gender
linked, they are not necessarily so, and anyone can be a proponent of either, or both. Scales has been profoundly influenced by Carol Gilligan's
book, In a Different Voice. She writes that Gilligan equates the development of an "ethic of rights" or an "ethic of justice" with boys and the development of an "ethic of care" or a focus on equity with girls. 78 Males

76. !d.
77. !d. at 48.
78. Scales, supra note 2, at 1380-81. Of course, assigning justice to boys and care to girls
is a generalization and neither Scales nor Gilligan goes so far as to say that the development of
these perspectives are strictly gender based. The broad assertion nonetheless tends to hold up.
Although, most women can deal with either ethic, fewer men develop the "ethic of care." So,
gender does seem to be a relevant factor. "Gilligan asserts that as a matter of personal moral
development, the ability to integrate the ethics of care with the ethics of rights signals maturity."
/d. at 1381 (footnote omitted).
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tend to focus on autonomy, or "the separation between self and others"
while females "perceive[] relationship[s] as constitutive of the self. "79
Paradigmatic male values, like objectivity, are defined as exclusive, identified by their presumed opposites. Those values cannot
be content with multiplicity; they create the other and then devour it. Objectivity ignores context; reason is the opposite of
emotion; rights precluded care. As long as the ruling ideology is
a function of this dichotomization, incorporationism threatens to
be mere co-optation, a more subtle version of female invisibility. 80
Scales adds, "Feminism does not claim to be objective, because objectivity is the basis for inequality. Feminism is not abstract, because abstraction when institutionalized shields the status quo from critique. Feminism
is result-oriented. It is vitally concerned with the oblivion fostered by lawyers' belief that process is what matters." 81 A fundamental tenet of feminist jurisprudence clearly identifies the first idea with how women tend to
be socialized and the second idea with how men tend to be socialized.
However, this socialization is most likely a remnant of ancient society
rather than a notion hardwired into our brains. We can all learn to value
the viewpoint of the other-if we are willing. "It is in the perspective of
the other that we begin to see ourselves." 82

B.

Consciousness Raising

One of the ways that we can learn to understand the perspective of
the other is through consciousness raising. Consciousness raising is more
than a bunch of discontented women sitting around complaining about
men; it is the opportunity to exchange stories and to explain how certain
events in our lives make us feel. "Consciousness raising assures women
that their point of view, which male culture has historically repressed and
devalued, can be resurrected. It puts women in touch with a world that
men have declared untouchable, and exposes the male ideology that masquerades as objectivity." 83 Not only does consciousness raising affirm a
woman's perspective, it is a way for women or men to examine their beliefs about the world and think about how their actions may affect others.
"Consciousness raising requires vigilant self-reflection on the social

79. ld. at 1382-83 (footnotes omitted).
80. Id. at 1383.
81. Jd. at 1385.
82. Cole, supra note 3, at 91.
83. !d. at 62.
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meaning of being a woman in a man's world. Self-reflection, for feminists as well as for any other marginalized group, is not so much a choice
as a way of being." 84 "Therefore, consciousness raising takes us beyond
indeterminate subjectivity towards social consensus. It is through the
method of consciousness raising that feminism's negative critique [of the
legal system] becomes transformative.'' 85 The negative critique becomes
transformative because it does more than simply criticize, it gains insight
and identifies weaknesses. Seeing the legal system for what it is, will allmv us to fortify the weak parts without impairing the foundation.
The substitution of intersubjectivity for objectivity as a
means of legitimating social values requires an entirely different
process. Rather than attempting to deny subjectivity, one must
listen to and account for all subjective perspectives. Rather than
viewing the world as com;tituted by objects, one recognizes others' claims to subject status. Methodologically, this calls for conversation and discourse between equal subjects, instead of introspection by an individual who plays God. The process therefore
guards against the tendency of theorists to universalize their perspective and, more importantly, the tendency of theory itself to
assume an all-encompassing stance. An intersubjective process
implies, in its very method, a certain equality and mutual respect
between human beings. 86
C.

E Pluribus Unum

The struggle is not who will or should rule, it is about how we can
come to a consensus and at the same time allow people the freedom to
choose their own lives free from current societal restraints. Scales
believes that we must
make a choice between adjudicative principles. The choice is not,
however, between male and female hegemony. The choice is
rather between a compulsion to control reality and a commitment
to restrain hegemony. Do we want a system that brooks no disagreement or one that invites as many points of view as the varieties of existence require? 87

84. !d. at 89 (footnote omitted).
85. !d. at 63.
86. !d. at 59, n.39.
87. Scales, supra note 2, at 1385-86 (footnotes omitted).
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"We must look beyond the familiar and look instead to the unfamiliar-we must gain a consciousness of that which is not necessarily of our
own traditional view, but of the view of others. By so doing we may allow ourselves to be liberated from our self-imposed oppression and allow
ourselves possible solutions. " 8 g
The feminist approach takes justification seriously; it is a more
honest and efficient way to achieve legitimacy. The feminist legal standard for equality is altogether principled in requiring
commitment to finding the moral crux of matters before the
court. The feminist approach will tax us. We will be exhausted
by bringing feminist method to bear. Yet we must force law makers and interpreters to hear that which they have been well
trained to ignore. We will have to divest ourselves of our learned
reticence, debrief ourselves every day. We will have to trust ourselves to be able to describe life to each other-in our courts, in
our legislatures, in our emergence together. 89
To practice feminism is harder than it seems; we must look at a variety of
viewpoints and not focus exclusively on our own, we must strive to do
justice while being fair, supporting law, and caring for those affected by
our decisions. "[I]f society is in some sense constituted by the world
views that give meaning to social interaction, then to change consciousness is to change society itself."90 Given the present state of society
would this be such a bad thing?
IV.

THE TROUBLE WITH FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE

Law, as a whole, is a combination of rules and interpretation of those
rules, objectivity and subjectivity, rules and standards, logical theory and
practical application, posited laws and ethical principles. 91 A distinctively
polemic jurisprudence "should be the last thing that any member of an
oppressed group-if that is how the modern American woman should be
described-wants to see dominate legal thought." 92 This "feminine" juris-

88. Cole. supra note 3. at 77 (citation.' omitted).
89. Scales, supra note 2. at 1403.
90. David Trubek. Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 575, 592 (1984).
91. See Richard Posner, Conservative Feminism, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191, 212 (1989).
92. /d. Judge Posner goes on to explain that those who reject formalism are not feminist
jurisprudists simply because they have rejected the formalistic aspects of the law. Rather, they "are
legal realists, or pragmatists, or instrumentalists, or skeptics-which is to say that they possess
outlooks on law that long predate the entry of women in significant numbers into positions of
influence in the legal profession." /d. at 213.
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prudence, with its ethic of care (as opposed to an ethic of rights), is one in
which discretion and individual circumstances take the fore in a judicial
decision. But a purely discretionary system, lacking formality of any
kind, is at its extreme, a "people's court" typified by mobocracy and
vigilantism, with the minority group standing atop the gallows, such as in
the appeal-less, judge-jury-and-executioner Klan courts in the pre-civil
rights South. 93
A.

Is It Feminist at All?

Leslie Bender, a prominent legal feminist and law professor, made
this interesting observation:
Each year that I teach torts I watch again as a majority of my students initially find [the] legal "no duty" rule reprehensible. After
the rationale is explained and the students become immersed in
the "reasoned" analysis, and after they take a distanced, objective
posture informed by liberalism's concerns for autonomy and liberty, many come to accept the legal rule that intuitively had
seemed so wrong to them. They are taught to reject their emotions, instincts, and ethics, and to view accidents and tragedies
abstractly, removed from their social and particularized contexts,
and to apply instead rationally-derived universal principles and a
vision of human nature as atomistic, and as free from constraint
as possible. They are also taught that there are legally relevant
distinctions between acts and omissions. . . . How would this
drowning-stranger hypothetical look from a new legal perspective informed by a feminist ethic based upon notions of caring,
responsibility, interconnectedness, and cooperation? 94
How, indeed. Bender's analysis of her students' response presents an
interesting problem with the idea of a feminine jurisprudence. If Bender
is speaking about the general response of her students, and that response
was uniform among most of her students, then one can hardly look at the
ethic of care-at least as it is described by Bender-and see an ethic that
is purely feminine in nature. Instead of feminine, perhaps, the proper term
should be humanist. 95 The idea of the humanist or caring sort of law, one

93. Admittedly, such an extreme discretionary system could also lead to tyranny by the
vocal minority, just as today more money is channeled to AIDS research than to cancer research
though arguably more members of society are affected by cancer than by AIDS.
94. Bender, supra note 34, at 33-34.
95. Although the "no duty" rule may not be illustrative of all legal principles, one would
nevertheless expect that such a response would be uniform. The authors, both law students, one
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that is not so rule-bound as to deprive the court of any latitude for mercy
or contemplation of individual circumstances, is the sort of law at the
heart of feminine jurisprudence. But is it not also so in formalistic or traditionallaw? What Bender would term an "ethic of care" could easily be
referred to as "policy," "mercy," or the "discretion" of the court. Perhaps
the question is not "whether there is a distinctively feminine outlook on
law, as distinct from an outlook that men and women share," but whether
the outlook that both genders share is displayed by both genders in their
actions, "though perhaps in different proportions."96
B.

The Penalty for Breaching the Ethic of Care

Consider, for example, another tort case-a simple automobile accident, in which a common, everyday tortfeasor, while speeding through
town, smashes into a victim who is exercising her pedestrian right of way
in a crosswalk. The collision crushes the victim and leaves her without
the use of her arms or legs. Of course the tortfeasor will be held legally
responsible for the harm caused, and the court will make the tortfeasor
pay. But is justice then entirely done? Money damages could hardly be
said to be adequate compensation for the loss of one's limbs, nor are
money damages sufficient to compensate the suffering the victim's family
will certainly face. Perhaps, then, the driver may satisfy justice by serving
time in prison. A justice of care might find that the driver's having to deal
with the emotional results of having deprived someone of the use of her
limbs and her livelihood is all the prison the driver needs, and would be
the most effective way to increase the driver's caution in the future. To
expect that kind of grief or emotional reaction for such an act in today's
society, however, is asking much. Without remorse, there is no catalyst
for change.
Bender maintains that no matter how much money is paid, or penance
done, there is still a great deal of care-giving that will have to be done hy
the victim's family, friends, or others. This care-giving is not necessarily
deemed to be the responsibility of the tortfeasor. The ethic of care would
require payment for that care-giving as well--even to the extent of having

male and one female, had exactly the response to the "no duty"' rule that Professor Bender
describes among her own students. But because Bender uses that response to demonstrate a
"feminine" response, and at least a conscious subjection of the feminine carmg response through
"reasoned analysis . . . [and] a distanced, objective posture," which is conunonly associated with
"male" legal jurisprudence, and because this response is not peculiarly female, it is somewhat
difficult to term the "ethic of care" a uniquely "female" jurisprudential theory-especially since,
as Professor Bender and the authors' own experience demonstrate, the "intuitive" ethic of care
which is offended by rules rooted in "rationally-derived" principles such as the "no duty" rule is
not always a response unique to women.
96. Posner, supra note 91, at 213.
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the tortfeasor give that care personally. 97 Bender concludes that "[t]his
seemingly minor change would transform the core of negligence law to a
human, responsive system. " 98
The idea is a nice one, but care-giving work, or the act of nurturing
and bringing the victim of a tort back to health or well-being, is not always (or is rarely) a quantifiable effort. Additionally, to make the tortfeasor continue to perform care giving in response to the harm caused would
be to inflict a penalty, rather than to exact compensation. Certainly the
family or friends of the victim have to continue to cope in many instances
with the continuing effects of a tort, but to cause the tortfeasor to be beholden to the victim for the rest of his life is, in no uncertain terms, punishment. Why do we punish people? If we cause the injurer to pay or to
provide care personally for the rest of the victim's life, we must ask,
"Why?" Do we hope to dissuade similar actions by others in the future?
Is it to exact some sort of retribution from the injurer? Or, would we inmet such a sentence upon the injurer because of some sort of reformative
prospect-some aspiration that by imposing the punishment on the injurer somehow we can teach him or her to exercise an ethic of care to some
greater degree. 99 Finally, to place this kind of burden-this sentence-upon the injurer is to effectually do away with the criminal justice
system. If we are to inflict this kind of punishment upon people for their
failure to act in accord with a particular ethic of care, then perhaps we
ought to do away with the civil justice system altogether in favor of a
purely criminal one.

C. The Caring Neighbor Standard
Some feminist legal scholars woulrl replace the "reasonable person"
standard with the "caring neighbor" standard. 10° Critics of the "caring"
standard, however, point out that in determining the standard of care we
must keep in mind that most neighbors are not caring, and most accident

97. See Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 905.
98. Bender, supra note 34, at 36.
99. What is it that we hope to accomplish? Do we desire punishment, restitution, deterrence,
or something else? Each theory for why we punish has its own advocates. For example, every
parent has his or her own notions of the proper way to discipline a child for spilling milk. Some
parents take the retributive approach and discipline by spanking-hoping for deterrence of future
carelessness. Others take the reformative approach and discipline their children by making the child
clean up the milk and learn the consequences of his or her actions. Which approach do we take
as a society so as to teach a greater ethic of care? That, too, depends upon each indi vidnal' s
experience with each respective system of "justice."
100. See Bender, supra note 96, at 905.
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victims are not neighbors. 101 Indeed, to hold a person potentially liable for
not acting as a caring neighbor will not have a persuasive effect upon
people in general to act with greater care in their dealings and
interactions with other people. 102 Judge Posner addresses Bender's proposed transformation of the law into a "human, responsive system" thus:
The only effect of adopting Bender's proposal [to replace the
reasonable standard with the caring standard] would be to shift
negligence liability in the direction of strict liability. Her "caring
neighbor" is an unnecessary step in the analysis. She might as
well argue directly for strict liability on the ground that it is the
more altruistic regime than negligence. 103
But strict liability is extremely rule-based, and less concerned with the
particulars of a case than perhaps the feminine ethic of care would
be-and those characteristics of ruleness and cold universality immediately bring to mind the "masculine" ethic of rights rather than the ethic of
care. 104 So in some ways the Bender model is more feminine, or carebased. But in other ways it is distinctively masculine in its formality.

See Posner, supra note 91, at 214.
Judge Posner illustrates this principle with a hypothetical:
[S]uppose an accident having expected cost of $100 could be prevented only by
an expenditure of $110 on care. Then the failure to prevent the accident would
not be negligent, and . . . the injurer would not be liable to his victim. But
presumably a caring neighbor would go the extra step to prevent the accident ...
so under Bender's proposal the injurer would be liable if he failed to prevent the
accident. But liability would not (except in special circumstances) induce him to
take the extra care, which by definition would cost more than the expected
accident; he would rather pay the expected judgement. Liability in such a case
would just make negligence liability strict liability.
/d. at 214, n. 43. It is also important to keep in mind that Judge Posner focuses on the economic
(and perhaps realist) theory of law. Again, the injurer may feel remorse for his wrong, and his
conscience may move him to spend the extra $10 on care rather than hit someone with his car and
for the rest of his life have to deal with the knowledge that he had seriously injured someone.
Speaking somewhat cynically, though realistically, those persons willing to spend the extra $10 are
fewer and fewer. In growing proportions of today's society, the cost of remorse is substantially
greater than $1 0.
103. /d. at 214.
104. /d. Judge Posner explains the seeming irony thus:
Strict liability is sometimes defended on the ground that it provides more
compensation to more accident victims. This is a partial analysis. Strict liability
can also result in higher prices, and the burden may be borne by consumers. The
net distributive impact is unclear. If these complications are ignored, maybe a
feminine outlook on law could be expected to stress compensation.
/d. Arguably, however, where automobile-pedestrian accidents occur, and inasmuch as there are
pedestrians who jaywalk and drivers who do not speed, there are cases in which the driver is not
necessarily negligent.
101.
102.

255]

FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE

281

D. The Source of the Feminine Voice
In listening to this feminine voice, one wonders from whence the
voice derives its distinctive tonal qualities. While there are those who
would argue that such a voice is inherent in all women, others argue that
the feminine voice, with its tonal qualities of care and responsibility, is
simply a reflection of values that have arisen from women's subordination by men, and is a voice full of the virtues and characteristics that
women have developed over the ages in response to millennia of victimization.105 So, in actuality, the feminine voice is, in its purest form, just as
deep and resonant as the male voice; only after centuries of care-giving,
subordination, and socialization, has that voice evolved to the pitch of
care-giving and responsibility that is today associated with woman-ness.
To listen to this feminine voice, then, would be to compound the effects
of age-old male domination and reaffirm the male-induced (and male-supported) roles adopted by women. More and more women are reexamining
their traditional roles and changing the timbre of their voices to express
their awareness of societal expectations. Over time the many feminine
voices have distinguished their individual parts, and thus have enriched
humanity's song.
E.

The Propriety of the Ethic ofCarefor Legal Reform

But even if the ethic of care does not have its roots in feminine history, what makes it a proper model for legal reform? Is this breakdown of
men and women's voices anything but purely arbitrary and artificially
created labeling? Why must the division be made down gender lines?
Why may it not be drawn down hair-color lines, shoe-size lines, or some
other physical characteristic? The fact that males have dominated a particular field, while an important consideration, is not conclusive evidence
that the overwhelming male-ness of that field is what in fact defines the
nature of that field.
If the ethic of care is not founded in the history of oppression of
women, but instead finds its source in the purely feminine experience of
motherhood and nurturing, what indicates that that experience is applicable or germane to governing and regulating relationships between other
persons is that everyone needs nurturing to some degree. Children die for
lack of nurturing. Even though the idea of an ethic of care is based on a
set of principles of morality that are meant to extend beyond a "domain of
special relationships," 106 that set of principles cannot be said to be uni-

105. See Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171, 1196-1202 (1992).
106. Gn..LIGAN, supra note 11, at 73.
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form across the spectrum of diverse social, economic, and cultural threads that create the fabric of American society. Still, it cannot be denied
that when and where caring exists, both the care-giver and the care-recipient benefit. But there is danger in caregiving. One such danger of
caregiving is described thus:
[T]he literature about mothering and caring acknowledges that
mothers and care givers are not immune from the danger of projecting one's own perspective onto the other when assessing the
other's needs and interests and that, in fact, caring sometimes
involves using one's own judgement about the other's needs,
even when doing so conflicts with the other's perspective. 107
Relationships upon which those principles would be based differ not
only among cultures, but, as the feminist voice theory itself asserts, between genders. There is little to indicate that the experience of motherhood and the experience of nursing children would be any more efficacious in the efficient and equitable distribution of justice than is the current formalistic "masculine" model. 108 "But the polarity between empathetic, equitable, discretionary, situation-specific justice, on the one hand,
and the 'rule of law' virtues of neutrality and 'ruleness,' on the other, is
far older than feminist jurisprudence." 109 It is highly improbable that an
implementation of a feminine ethic of care could take place without radical transformation of the legal system-something that is unlikely as long
as the legal profession is male dominated. 110 Just how would women in
general be affected by a transformation to a legal system based more on
judicial discretion and contextualism? Judge Posner speculates: "It is
hard to say whether women would be on balance better or worse off if the
legal system were more empathetic than it is, but it does not appear that
women fare particularly well under the discretionary system of qadi justice in traditional Moslem law." 111

107. McClain, supra note 105, at 1202.
108. ld. at 1196-1202. McClain points to recent feminist empirical work on care which
"argues that care giving is 'not an appropriate model for all social relationships,' since it 'fosters
exclusivity and privatism rather than a sense of collective responsibility.'" ld. (quoting Emily K.
Abel & Margaret K. Nelson, Circles of Care: An Introductory Essay, in CIRCLES OF CARE, 4, 7
(Emily K. Abel & Margaret K. Nelson, eds., 1990)).
109. Posner, supra note 91, at 217.
110. See McClain, supra note 105, at 1196-1202.
111. Posner, supra note 91, at 212.
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The Coercive Element

The legal system as it operates today is generally concerned with objective standards rather than with subjective interpretations of conduct.
"Coercion of caring activity where a caring attitude is absent might satisfy a legalistic duty of care but such 'caring' might lack moral worth."m
The law cannot compel a person to exercise a "caring" attitude any more
than it can compel any other kind of feeling within a human being. A
court cannot compel a person to feel pity, remorse, or compassion. A
court cannot compel a person to feel joy for another party in a lawsuit--or for anyone for that matter. Certainly in highly particular circumstances
the court may impose its ruling as to the morality or ethical nature of a
particular act. Courts of inquiry in cases of violations of the attorney's
professional code of ethics, for instance, are example...;; in which the court
may exercise legal coercion. But such coercion is upon a member of a
profession. The primary means of motivation for ethical conduct in society is a desire to do what is best for society and the community as a whole. Gilligan's ethic of care would apply to all of humanity rather than simply between specific individuals, and there remains "a fundamental question whether such an ethic (or duty) [as the ethic of care] is an appropriate subject for legal coercion, as opposed to personal and communal aspiration."113 Coercion is neither practical nor likely, but caring can be a
goal for more people as they are influenced by caring others.
G.

The Problematic Catch-all Model for the Ethic of Care

Whose ethic of care ought we apply? If we are to look to a "caring
neighbor" standard, which neighbor ought we choose? Some critics have
pointed out that to choose one model of what that ethic of care ought to
be might "invite state censure or control of actual women who fail to live
up to or whose experience is not ret1ected in such idealized standards." 114
A model based on some arbitrarily delineated ethical ideal ca1mot recognize the vast racial, social, and economic differences among people in
general. For instance, it would be next to impossible to reach a consensus
from five women 115 representing five different religious, marital, and economic backgrounds as to what a proper "ethic" of care ought to include,
inasmuch as each person's idea of "caring" may be different. In an ideal
situation, the legal system would be much more empathetic to all minor-

112. McClain, supra note 105, at 1201.
113. /d.
114. /d. at 1202.
115. The hypothetical could just a.~ easily include men, but for the sake of simplicity in
determining the "feminine voice," the sampling includes only women-as "authorities" on the
feminine voice.
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ity groups. But "[s]uch models, if they are to be used, need to recognize
the real constraints on women's lives due to poverty, lack of health care,
abusive relationships, and the like that contribute to some mothers' feelings of powerlessness to meet some middle-class ideal of care. " 116
Nonetheless, these are the reasons why we need to explore an "ethic
of care." Such an ethic attempts to account for real, personal situations
and is far more pragmatic than abstract ideals of "justice." It does, in fact,
exist in some forms in today's justice system. No contract will be found
unconscionable where the court does not look at the respective bargaining
power of the parties. Such an approach could be expanded. Each case
decided in court might thus make the rule of law to fit each particular situation rather than make each particular situation fit a particular rule of
law.

V.

CoNCLUSION

As we have discussed, while feminism might not be the perfect jurisprudential theory, neither are traditional theories satisfactory for dealing
with the practical realities of our world.
Feminists have always been willing to challenge the status quo in
their search for expanded rights and a better life for all. We ought to fear
the day when society becomes complacent enough to stand idly by as
American jurisprudence takes its own course. Justice is part of government, and ours is a government for the people and by the people. By expanding the definition of "equality," feminists hope to thereby expand
access to both justice and feelings of connection to society-access and
connection of all people by all people.
Feminism is more pragmatic than some of its brother theories.
Women have grown accustomed to playing by male rules on the
playground. "Feminist jurisprudence cannot afford to rest in idealism or
despair, for women who recognize their unequal treatment cannot afford
to accept it. Because feminist theory and theorists are grounded in the
material reality of gender, their theory is immediately connected to human relations. " 117
As we wrote at the beginning of our paper, we seek cooperation between men and women to form a more perfect combination of perspectives and roles. We do not seek to make women of men or men of women. 118 After all, gender is gender, and rather than merge the two into one

116. McClain, supra note 105, at 1202.
117. Cole, supra note 3, at 86.
118. We look again to Gilligan for a simple and insightful observation. Gilligan points to the
very beginning, "to A,dam and Eve--a story which shows, among other things, that if you make
a woman out of a man, you are bound to get into trouble." GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 6.
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homogenous and androgynous form, we ought to revel in and explore the
possibilities that come from our differences. For many, such a renovation
of the judicial system would involve compromise and change; but as Cole
writes, "[t]he road to social change may in fact be circular: it begins with
mutual respect and ends with the conditions that might make mutual respect possible." 119 No matter how we characterize it or where we begin,
we must strive for mutuality of respect and individual sovereignty in determining the direction of our lives.
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